

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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July 15, 1966

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Dear Dick:

I have read Admiral Raborn's letter about security with great interest. Since State Department installations are primary intelligence targets, we welcome all of the guidance and assistance the Central Intelligence Agency can give in helping us to achieve maximum security.

The recommendations contained in Admiral Raborn's letter have been studied by our Office of Security. I wish to assure you that action is being taken to improve the Department's security program in light of the lessons of the Sergeant Robert L. Johnson case.

Security briefings both here and abroad are being expanded to incorporate the Johnson case and the Army Circular entitled, "Hostile Intelligence Exploitation of U. S. Army Personnel."

In our training and development of supervisors, greater emphasis will be placed on the responsibility of supervisors to be alert for patterns of improper behavior and conduct which could be exploited by hostile intelligence services. Our Office of Security would appreciate hearing of your experiences in any indoctrination program conducted for supervisors by the Agency.

The Department's personnel security program will continue to be maintained at a high level. A pre-employment full-field investigation is required prior to the granting of a security clearance. A determination has been made to classify the Department's positions as "critical sensitive".

The Honorable

Richard M. Helms,

Director of Central Intelligence,
Washington, D. C.

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

NSA and DOS review(s) completed.

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SECRET

-2-

Included in our investigations is a personal security interview of applicants. This is a procedure which is not generally followed by other investigative agencies of the Government. Special criteria which normally entail "an updating investigation" govern clearance of the limited number of employees who have access to special intelligence information. The Department initiated a reinvestigation program in 1964 for all employees. This program will ultimately provide for a routine "updating investigation" on a five year cycle. Greater emphasis will be given this program in order to reach this objective.

I agree that it is the responsibility of every agency within the intelligence community to establish uniform standards applicable to all aspects of their respective security programs. In this connection I wish to express our appreciation for the cooperation and the assistance our Office of Security has received in its participation in the Security Committee and the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee of the USIB.

Sincerely yours,



Dean Rusk

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